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INTRODUCTION 
When Joseph R. Biden and Donald J. Trump took the stage at the first 2020 
presidential debate, they were the oldest major party candidates for the 
presidency ever1—and one may have been contagious with a virus that is 
notoriously lethal for the elderly.2  Only days after the debate, Trump was 
diagnosed with COVID-19.3  His case was so severe that officials believed 
he would need a ventilator,4 and Trump feared that he would die.5  Despite 
being near Trump for ninety minutes, Biden subsequently tested negative for 
the virus.6  Trump survived after receiving a cocktail of experimental 
medications used to treat severe cases of the virus.7 
Three months later, on January 6, 2021, the U.S. Congress was poised to 
certify Biden’s victory, and his vice presidential running mate, Senator 
Kamala D. Harris, was scheduled to participate.8  The proceedings were 
disrupted by a violent mob targeting members of Congress.  Some attackers 
said they aimed to assassinate Vice President Michael R. Pence.9  Harris’s 
arrival to the U.S. Capitol had been delayed just long enough for her to avoid 
 
 1. Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202:  President Trump and Joe Biden Are 
the Oldest Nominees for President, Ever, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2020, 8:02 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/17/health-202-president-trump-joe-biden-
are-oldest-nominees-president-ever/ [https://perma.cc/WDP2-TZ98]. 
 2. See Jamie Ducharme, The Presidential Debate Was the Kind of COVID-19 Risk 
Experts Have Been Warning Us About, TIME (Oct. 2, 2020, 12:46 PM), 
https://time.com/5895518/trump-coronavirus-covid-debate/ [https://perma.cc/ZE4P-WSPN]; 
Older Adults, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Dec. 13, 2020), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20201213203949/https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/need-extra-precautions/older-adults.html. 
 3. Ducharme, supra note 2. 
 4. Noah Weiland et al., Trump Was Sicker than Acknowledged with Covid-19, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2021, 3:50 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/us/politics/trump-
coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/3MFX-38KC]. 
 5. Olivia Nuzzi, The Entire Presidency Is a Superspreading Event, N.Y. MAG.  
(Oct. 9, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/10/donald-trump-covid-19-white-
house.html [https://perma.cc/2JX7-6ZZ3]. 
 6. Annie Linskey, Biden Tests Negative for Coronavirus, Campaign Says, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 4, 2020, 7:48 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-tests-negative-for-
coronavirus-campaign-says/2020/10/04/72e65358-0653-11eb-9be6-cf25fb429f1a_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/UG3B-5UTM]. 
 7. Weiland et al., supra note 4. 
 8. Chelsea Janes, For Friends and Allies of Kamala D. Harris, Deadly Capitol Attacks 
Prompt Fresh Fears, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2021, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/harris-fears-safety/2021/01/13/bbd3d31a-54ff-
11eb-a817-e5e7f8a406d6_story.html [https://perma.cc/G3X6-N8PR]. 
 9. Ashley Parker et al., How the Rioters Who Stormed the Capitol Came Dangerously 
Close to Pence, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2021, 9:56 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pence-rioters-capitol-attack/2021/01/15/ab62e434-
567c-11eb-a08b-f1381ef3d207_story.html [https://perma.cc/QS8J-V8YJ] (“[R]ioters began 
chanting, ‘Hang Mike Pence!’”). 
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being present for the insurrection.10  Following the siege, authorities took 
extraordinary precautions to protect Biden and Harris on Inauguration Day.11 
The 2020 presidential election involved several significant threats to the 
health and safety of the candidates.  But dangers to presidential candidates 
and presidents-elect have been present before.  After winning the 1860 
presidential election, Abraham Lincoln dodged an alleged assassination plot 
by wearing a disguise to sneak into Washington, D.C., for his inauguration.12  
A decade later, presidential candidate Horace Greeley died shortly after the 
election, creating a dilemma over how the electoral votes he had won in his 
losing bid should be cast and counted.13  In 1912, Vice President James 
Sherman, who had been nominated for reelection, died less than a week 
before his ticket lost the election.14 
Less than three weeks before Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first inauguration in 
1933, a gunman fired on him but instead hit five other people in Roosevelt’s 
car, including the mayor of Chicago.15  In the lead-up to President 
Roosevelt’s successful reelection in 1944, he suffered from ailments that 
would cause his death less than three months into his new term.16  During the 
1956 campaign, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had suffered a heart 
attack in 1955, obscured his health issues and then had a stroke in the year 
following his reelection.17  Eisenhower’s successor, John F. Kennedy, who 
also concealed serious ailments while campaigning,18 faced an assassination 
attempt before taking office.19  Kennedy’s brother, Robert F. Kennedy, was 
a leading candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968 when 
 
 10. Janes, supra note 8. 
 11. Carol D. Leonnig et al., Secret Service Launches Massive Security Operation to 




 12. Joe Heim, The Attempted Assassination of Abraham Lincoln, WASH. POST (June 5, 
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-attempted-assassination-of-
abraham-lincoln/2020/06/04/e05eeed8-8e3d-11ea-a0bc-4e9ad4866d21_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/DF7N-BPXS]. 
 13. See Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Ensuring 
the Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 56 n.246 
(2012) [hereinafter First Succession Clinic]. 
 14. JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS:  THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 
161 (1965). 
 15. Ronald G. Shafer, The Scariest Moment of a Presidential Transition:  Six Gunshots 
Fired at FDR, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2020/11/13/fdr-assassination-attempt-transition-
president-elect/ [https://perma.cc/5N9N-MRUC]. 
 16. Second Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Fifty 
Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  Recommendations for Improving the Presidential 
Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 989–90 (2017) [hereinafter Second Succession 
Clinic]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 990. 
 19. Dan Lewis, The Kennedy Assassin Who Failed, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 6, 2012), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-kennedy-assassin-who-failed-153519612/ 
[https://perma.cc/8LHS-JVL7]. 
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he was assassinated.20  Four years later, as George Wallace campaigned for 
the 1972 Democratic nomination, he was shot and left permanently paralyzed 
below the waist.21 
Thomas Eagleton was the 1972 Democratic nominee for the vice 
presidency for only eighteen days until he stepped aside amid concerns about 
his past mental health struggles.22  In the final weeks of the 1980 presidential 
campaign, the man, who a year later shot President Ronald Reagan, came 
within feet of President Jimmy Carter at a campaign event.23  Weeks after 
President Bill Clinton won reelection in 1996, before the Electoral College 
had cast its votes, a last-minute motorcade detour during a foreign trip 
avoided a bridge rigged with explosives.24  In November 2000, not long 
before he was declared vice president-elect, Dick Cheney had his fourth heart 
attack.25 
Despite previous candidate vacancies and near misses, the procedures for 
how to address many of these contingencies have shortcomings.  Some 
scenarios are left unaddressed.  The policies for other situations might be 
difficult to use or could result in undemocratic outcomes.  This Article 
discusses possible reforms for addressing disability or death of presidential 
candidates from the time they are nominated at their political parties’ 
conventions to when they are sworn into office on Inauguration Day. 
Part I addresses the time period from the political conventions to Election 
Day.  The political parties should consider changing their rules to make the 
vice-presidential nominee the designated successor to the presidential 
nomination but give the national committees the power to override the vice 
presidential candidate’s automatic succession.  Additionally, the parties 
should create processes for candidate inabilities and “dual vacancies” of the 
presidential and vice presidential nominations.  This part also discusses the 
possibility of delaying an election due to death or inability, as well as policies 
for encouraging candidates to be transparent about their health. 
Part II addresses the period from Election Day to the date when the 
Electoral College meets.  If a candidate death or inability occurs in this 
period, electors who are not bound by state laws to vote for the deceased or 
disabled candidate could cast their ballots for replacement candidates.  But 
the prospect of electors and the political parties selecting replacement 
candidates raises democratic legitimacy concerns because the Electoral 
 
 20. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1010. 
 21. Alabama Governor George Wallace Shot, HIST. (Feb. 9, 2010), 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/governor-george-wallace-shot 
[https://perma.cc/3TAA-UNK7]. 
 22. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 991. 
 23. Id. at 1010. 
 24. L.A. Times Staff, U.S. Presidential Assassination and Attempts, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 
2012, 8:49 AM), https://timelines.latimes.com/us-presidential-assassinations-and-attempts/ 
[https://perma.cc/7F25-TSX5]. 
 25. See Peter Baker & Julie Bosman, In New Book, Cheney Recalls 5 Heart Attacks and 
His Brush with Death, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
10/17/us/politics/in-new-book-cheney-recalls-5-heart-attacks-and-his-brush-with-death.html 
[https://perma.cc/68UP-NW3H]. 
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College has evolved to have a purely mechanical function.  State laws 
requiring electors to vote for dead or disabled candidates would reflect the 
principles of the electoral system, but such laws might face objections on 
legal and policy grounds. 
The final part addresses the period after the Electoral College votes, which 
extends through Congress’s counting of the electoral votes to Inauguration 
Day.  The Twentieth Amendment covers death and inability during this 
period, but procedures for declaring inabilities are needed.  Other concerns 
are raised by certain succession scenarios.  If the president-elect and vice 
president-elect both died or became unable to perform presidential duties, the 
speaker of the House would act as president starting on Inauguration Day.  
This could result in the party that lost the presidential election taking control 
of the White House.  Congress should eliminate this possibility by 
designating legislative leaders of the president-elect’s party as the successors.  
This part also considers how Congress might use its authority under Section 
4 of the Twentieth Amendment to provide for the death of candidates in 
contingent elections, which involve Congress choosing the winner of the 
presidential or vice presidential race when no candidate receives a majority 
of electoral votes.  Finally, this part discusses the presidential succession 
vulnerability that exists during the Inauguration Day ceremony on 
January 20. 
I.  DEATH OR INABILITY BEFORE ELECTION DAY 
The political parties’ rules authorize their national committees to fill 
vacancies on the parties’ national tickets that occur after the national 
conventions.  The charter and bylaws of the Democratic Party call for the 
more than 200 members26 of the national committee to “fill[] vacancies in 
the nominations for the office of President and Vice President” by majority 
vote at a special meeting called by the party chairperson.27  The Procedural 
Rules of the 2020 Democratic National Convention elaborate by stating that 
vacancies might occur as the result of “death, resignation or disability of a 
nominee.”28  Additionally, the convention rules require the party chairperson 
to “confer with the Democratic leadership of the United States Congress and 
the Democratic Governors Association and [] report to the Democratic 
National Committee.”29 
 
 26. About the Democratic Party, DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., https://democrats.org/who-
we-are/about-the-democratic-party/ [https://perma.cc/LE4R-G2J6] (last visited Sept. 17, 
2021). 
 27. See BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES art. II, §§ 7(c), 8(d), 
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/DNC_Charter_Bylaws_3.12.181.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q7V7-TMHR]; CHARTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED 
STATES art. III, § 1(c), https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ 
DNC_Charter_Bylaws_3.12.181.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7V7-TMHR]. 
 28. PROCEDURAL RULES OF THE 2020 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION r. F, 
https://www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FINAL-Permanent-
Convention-Rules-of-Procedure-7.30.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2QS-4SUW]. 
 29. Id. 
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The Rules of the Republican Party provide the 168-member30 national 
committee with the power to fill vacancies that “may occur by reason of 
death, declination, or otherwise” of the presidential or vice presidential 
candidate.31  The members of the national committee would vote as part of 
their state delegations to the Republican Convention, with each delegation 
receiving the same number of votes that they received at the convention.32  A 
replacement candidate would need to receive majority support.33  The Rules 
of the Republican Party provide the alternative of reconvening the national 
convention to fill any vacancies.34 
A.  Death of the Presidential Nominee 
The parties should consider changing their rules for the death of a 
presidential nominee to make the vice presidential nominee the designated 
successor to the presidential nomination.35  But, to provide flexibility, the 
rules should allow a majority of the national committee to override the vice 
presidential candidate’s succession.  After succeeding to the presidential 
nomination, the new nominee should select a vice presidential nominee with 
approval from a majority of the national committee.36 
The U.S. Constitution makes the vice president the first designated 
successor to the presidency37 because it helps ensure that there is always 
someone to discharge the office’s powers and duties.38  Of course, the need 
for a replacement presidential nominee is less urgent.  Unlike presidents, 
nominees do not need to be constantly on call to respond to crises.  Yet, a 
delay in appointing a new presidential nominee could still be detrimental, 
especially if Election Day is close. 
Under the two major parties’ current rules, a prolonged process for 
selecting a replacement is possible.  The parties’ national committees, which 
are empowered to select a replacement nominee, consist of over 150 
members from across the country.39  It is easy to imagine that the committees 
would struggle to arrive at a consensus.  Recent primary cycles have featured 
 
 30. Alex Isenstadt, RNC Invites 2024 Hopefuls to January Meeting in Show of Neutrality 
Toward Trump, POLITICO (Dec. 2, 2020, 6:09 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/ 
12/02/rnc-2024-hopefuls-trump-442302 [https://perma.cc/3V5E-B8TT]. 
 31. THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY r. 9(a) (2018), https://prod-cdn-
static.gop.com/media/documents/2016-Republican-Rules-
Reformatted2018_1533138132.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2LL-FZ56]. 
 32. See id. r. 9(b). 
 33. Id. r. 9(d). 
 34. Id. r. 9(a). 
 35. See FEERICK, supra note 14, at 273 (“[T]he people would likely insist that the 
vice-presidential nominee be chosen to fill the vacancy.”). 
 36. Party rules, as opposed to laws, are preferable for candidate death and inability 
procedures.  Although a law applying to all parties might promote clarity and uniformity, it 
would almost certainly be an infringement on the parties’ First Amendment associational 
rights.  See New York State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 202–03 (2008) (“A 
political party has a First Amendment right . . . to choose a candidate-selection process.”). 
 37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XXV, § 1; see also id. amend. XX, § 3. 
 38. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 132 (2005). 
 39. See About the Democratic Party, supra note 26; Isenstadt, supra note 30. 
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rivalries between various wings of the parties.40  These tensions could 
reemerge in the process of selecting a replacement.  Although there would be 
a political imperative to quickly and decisively coalesce around a 
replacement,41 forging agreement among over 150 people on such a 
consequential decision still presents a major challenge, especially when the 
parties appear to lack a detailed process for doing so. 
A failure to quickly select a replacement nominee could damage the 
party’s chances for winning the presidency.  It could also harm the country’s 
democracy.  The two-party system counts on both parties presenting voters 
with a choice between two credible nominees about whom the voters have 
enough time to learn.  By the time presidential candidates have received their 
parties’ nominations at the conventions, they have been campaigning for at 
least a year and have been the focal points of their parties’ nationally 
televised conventions.  It would be essential for replacement nominees to use 
all of the remaining time until the election to introduce themselves to the 
public.  A significant delay would deprive voters of the opportunity to cast 
informed votes and could even cause confusion at the polls.  If a replacement 
was not named in time to update ballots, or at least to sufficiently educate the 
public, some voters may not even know for whom they were voting. 
A replacement candidate chosen by party leadership might lack legitimacy 
due to the absence of a popular mandate.  The original presidential nominee 
would have received the support of millions of voters during the primaries, 
while the replacement candidate may have received no support from primary 
voters.  For much of the country’s history, political party leaders selected 
their parties’ presidential nominees.42  But over the past half-century, the 
principle that primary voters should select presidential nominees has become 
firmly entrenched.43  The democratic legitimacy held by the presidential 
nominee would best be replicated by the vice presidential nominee’s 
succession to the nomination.  Even though the vice presidential nominee 
might not have run in the primaries, the presidential nominee would have 
selected the vice presidential nominee—another norm that has emerged 
 
 40. See, e.g., Jonathan Martin, A Major Fear for Democrats:  Will the Party Come 
Together by November?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/ 
us/politics/democratic-party-unity-primary.html [https://perma.cc/94JJ-GF9K]. 
 41. The process did move quickly the only time that a party replaced a candidate before 
an election. See Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1008–09.  After Thomas Eagleton 
stepped down from the vice presidential nomination in 1972, the Democratic National 
Committee swiftly, and nearly unanimously, approved the replacement, who the presidential 
candidate had selected. See James M. Naughton, Shriver Is Named for Second Place by the 
Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1972), https://www.nytimes.com/1972/08/09/archives/ 
shriver-is-named-for-second-place-by-the-democrats-national.html [https://perma.cc/9MJG-
MNAG].  But the process probably would not be nearly as simple for filling a vacancy at the 
top of the ticket. 
 42. Elaine C. Kamarck, Returning Peer Review to the American Presidential Nomination 
Process, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 709, 711–12 (2018). 
 43. See id. at 712–14; Adam Levy, DNC Changes Superdelegate Rules in Presidential 
Nomination Process, CNN (Aug. 25, 2018, 7:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/25/ 
politics/democrats-superdelegates-voting-changes/index.html [https://perma.cc/6N5N-
7WQ7]. 
590 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
within the last century.44  Therefore, the vice presidential nominee would 
probably have many of the same policy positions that won the presidential 
nominee the support of primary voters. 
The vice presidential nominee is preferable to other possible designated 
successors, including the candidate who finished second in the party’s 
presidential primary.  Given the importance of the primary process, some 
might argue that it is critical to select a replacement nominee who had 
received support from primary voters.  But even after a close primary race, it 
is possible that the runner up would have vastly different policy views from 
the deceased presidential nominee—views that may have led primary voters 
to vote against the runner-up.45  Additionally, the runner-up would probably 
want to choose a new vice presidential candidate, which would eliminate any 
continuity in the party’s ticket.  Making the vice presidential candidate the 
designated successor would also provide another incentive for presidential 
candidates to choose vice presidential candidates who are capable of serving 
as president—a critical qualification that has sometimes been undervalued.46 
Admittedly, the vice presidential candidate might not always be the ideal 
successor to the presidential nomination.47  Political considerations, such as 
“ticket balancing,” may have been a primary consideration in the vice 
presidential candidate’s selection, and the candidate’s suitability for the 
presidency may not have received enough attention.48  It is also possible that 
a party might be skeptical of the vice presidential candidate’s chances of 
winning at the top of the ticket.  Accordingly, a majority of the national 
committee should be able to override the vice presidential candidate’s 
succession.  To select an alternate presidential nominee, the party might 
employ the special committee process that is discussed below for situations 
in which both the presidential and vice presidential candidates die.49 
Allowing the replacement presidential nominee to select a new vice 
presidential nominee, with approval from the national committee, would 
recognize the importance of the working relationship between the president 
and vice president.50  Presidential nominees often search for vice presidential 
 
 44. See JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY:  THE PATH TO 
SIGNIFICANCE FROM MONDALE TO BIDEN 173–74 (2016). 
 45. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1015. 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 1014 (noting that 2008 Republican presidential nominee John McCain 
selected Sarah Palin as his running mate “without probing the depth of her knowledge on 
domestic and foreign policy”). 
 47. Fordham Law School’s Second Presidential Succession Clinic recommended that the 
vice presidential candidate only be the designated successor in the final weeks of the 
campaign.  Before then, a “[v]acancy committee” would suggest potential replacements to the 
national committee. See id. at 1016–17. 
 48. See id. at 1014–15. 
 49. See infra Part I.B. 
 50. It is essential for parties to have both presidential and vice presidential candidates 
because some states count votes by “ticket[s]” instead of by presidential candidate. Akhil Reed 
Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death:  Closing the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 
48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 220 (1995). 
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nominees who complement their governing and managerial styles.51  That is 
because the vice president has become an integral figure in most 
administrations, in some cases serving as the top advisor to the president and 
taking responsibility for critical initiatives.52  Recognizing the importance of 
the relationship between the president and vice president, the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment gave the president the discretion to nominate a replacement vice 
president when there is a vacancy.53  In fact, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s 
framers cited the modern practice of the political parties allowing presidential 
nominees to choose the vice presidential nominee.54 
B.  Death of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Nominees 
For a scenario where both the presidential and vice presidential nominees 
have died, the parties should consider a rule allowing a special committee to 
suggest a replacement presidential nominee to the national committee, which 
would need to approve the recommended candidate by majority vote.55  If 
the national committee did not give its approval, the special committee could 
suggest another candidate or the national committee could take it upon itself 
to select a new nominee.  The special committee might consist of 
representatives of:  (1) the party, such as the chairperson; (2) the party’s 
governors and congressional leadership, such as speaker of the House, House 
minority leader, and Senate majority or minority leader; and (3) the deceased 
candidates’ campaign.  Once the party selects a new presidential nominee, 
the nominee should choose a running mate with approval from a majority of 
the national committee. 
The parties’ current rules do not explicitly cover a dual vacancy of the 
presidential and vice presidential nominations, but the procedures for 
individual vacancies would likely still work.  Those procedures would call 
for the respective national committees to fill both vacancies,56 with the 
Republican Party’s rules providing the alternative of reconvening the 
national convention.57 
 
 51. See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. WORKING GRP. ON VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION, 
SELECTING A VICE PRESIDENT:  ADVICE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 4 (2016). 
 52. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 44, at 4. 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2; Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment:  Lessons in Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 982–83 
(2010). 
 54. Goldstein, supra note 53, at 984. 
 55. This idea draws on the Second Succession Clinic’s proposal for the parties to create a 
“[v]acancy committee” to suggest potential replacements to the national committee. See 
Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 1016–17.  The parties should consider defining 
the membership of a special committee in advance of when it is needed. 
 56. CHARTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES art. III, § 1(c), 
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/DNC_Charter_Bylaws_3.12.181.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q7V7-TMHR]. 
 57. THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY r. 9(a) (2018), https://prod-cdn-
static.gop.com/media/documents/2016-Republican-Rules-
Reformatted2018_1533138132.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2LL-FZ56]. 
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A scenario where the national committee needed to select replacements for 
both spots on the party’s ticket at the same time could be even more unwieldy 
and time consuming under the current rules than filling a sole vacancy.  A 
special committee with far fewer members than the national committee might 
streamline the process.  There might still be disagreement among the special 
committee, but its smaller size would probably facilitate meaningful dialogue 
and deliberation. 
Including at least some of the party’s governors and congressional leaders 
on the committee would add democratic accountability because those 
officials are elected.  Consultation with governors and congressional leaders 
on filling vacancies is already called for by the party’s Procedural Rules of 
the 2020 Democratic National Convention.58  The officials from the deceased 
candidate’s campaign would help ensure that their candidate’s vision, which 
primary voters endorsed, would be reflected in the choice of a replacement. 
C.  Inability of the Presidential Nominee 
The political parties should consider authorizing the vice presidential 
nominee and the special committee described above to declare presidential 
nominees unable.  An inability declaration should require a two-thirds vote 
from the special committee and approval from the vice presidential nominee.  
The presidential nominee should be allowed to appeal an inability 
determination to the national committee, which would then need to ratify the 
inability determination by a two-thirds vote.59  If a presidential nominee were 
removed for inability, the vice presidential nominee should become the 
presidential nominee and pick a new running mate with majority approval 
from the national committee.  To avoid this process, candidates who 
recognized that they were unable could simply resign. 
Both parties’ current rules envision candidate disability, but they do not 
define “disability” or provide a way to determine its existence.  The 
Democratic Party’s rules explicitly mention “disability,”60 while the 
Republican Party’s rules recognize that vacancies in the party’s nominations 
“may occur by reason of death, declination, or otherwise.”61  The “otherwise” 
language is best understood as encompassing a wide range of contingencies 
that make a candidate unavailable, certainly including disability.62 
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Before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the Constitution, like 
the political parties’ rules, lacked a definition for presidential inability or a 
process for declaring it.63  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers declined 
to add a definition, preferring instead to create processes for determining 
inability.64  The amendment’s Section 3 allows the president to voluntarily 
declare himself disabled, while Section 4 lets the vice president and a 
majority of the Cabinet or another body created by Congress declare the 
president unable.65 
Although different considerations exist in the pre-inaugural period, the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s inability procedures provide some insights for 
crafting candidate inability procedures.  Additionally, use of an inability 
process similar to one in the Constitution might encourage the public to view 
the process as legitimate.  The amendment’s framers made the vice president 
an indispensable participant in the Section 4 process partially because the 
vice president would take over in the event of the president’s removal from 
the office’s powers and duties.66  For the same reason, it would be sensible 
to involve the vice presidential nominee in an inability determination, if the 
parties made the vice presidential nominee the automatic successor to the 
presidential nomination, as this Article suggests the parties consider. 
Empowering the person in the second spot to take part in a process that 
could move that person to the top of the ticket might appear to create a 
conflict of interest.  But the political repercussions would probably be severe 
for taking part in a removal that the public deemed unwarranted.  And, 
historically, vice presidents have been hesitant to initiate transfers of power, 
even when it might have been necessary.67 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment involves the president’s Cabinet secretaries 
in an inability determination for several reasons.  The members of the Cabinet 
are presumably political allies of the president who would be unlikely to 
improperly participate in declaring the president unable.68  Additionally, the 
Cabinet secretaries’ work and interactions with the president might give them 
information about the president’s health.69  These considerations also support 
involving the vice presidential nominee and representatives of the campaign 
in declaring the presidential candidate unable.  Consultation with doctors and 
other relevant medical experts should inform inability determinations where 
necessary, just as the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers expected the 
Cabinet and vice president to seek expert input.70 
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Giving elected officials and the vice presidential nominee a role in 
determining presidential candidate inability would add accountability to the 
process.  The lawmakers who designed the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
believed the decision-makers must be accountable to the public.71  Elected 
officials are accountable to their constituents, and the vice presidential 
nominee is accountable to voters on Election Day. 
“Disability” should not be defined in the rules for the same reason it is left 
undefined in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  to provide flexibility.72  Not all 
of the conditions that might merit use of the disability procedures are 
predictable, making it important for the decision-makers to have discretion.  
But the rules should make it difficult to remove candidates for all but the 
most serious ailments.  Deference to the presidential candidate reflects the 
importance of the popular mandate the candidate received from primary 
voters.  Allowing the presidential candidate to appeal a disability 
determination to the national committee would provide a critical check.  And 
requiring the national committee to ratify a disability determined by a 
two-thirds vote would weight the process in the candidate’s favor—just as 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s appeal provision is tilted toward the 
president.73 
Removal of a presidential nominee should be permanent.  Although it is 
important to maximize the possibility that the candidate who primary voters 
choose will be on the ballot, multiple changes to a party’s national ticket in 
the weeks before Election Day risk confusing voters and preventing many 
from casting informed votes. 
D.  Inability of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Nominees 
The parties should consider allowing the special committee to handle 
scenarios where both the presidential nominee and vice presidential nominee 
become disabled.  Both nominees should be allowed to appeal the decision 
to the national committee.  After both candidates have been removed from 
the ticket, the special committee should suggest a replacement presidential 
nominee to the national committee.  Following approval from the national 
committee of a new presidential nominee, the nominee should choose a new 
vice presidential candidate. 
The process for declaring a dual inability should closely mirror the process 
for declaring an inability of the presidential nominee, and the process for 
selecting a replacement should be the same as the replacement process for 
when both candidates die.  The only difference would be that the unable vice 
presidential nominee would not participate in the inability declaration. 
A dual inability is a remote possibility, but it is still important to provide 
for it.  The presidential succession framework currently lacks a procedure for 
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a dual inability of the president and vice president.74  The vulnerability 
created by this gap was highlighted in October 2020 when President Trump 
contracted COVID-19 and Vice President Pence was at risk of falling ill.75  
At the time, Trump and Pence were the Republican nominees for president 
and vice president. 
E.  Vice Presidential Nominee Death and Inability 
If the vice presidential candidate dies, the parties should consider allowing 
the presidential candidate to choose a replacement nominee with approval 
from a majority of the national committee.  To declare a vice presidential 
nominee unable, the presidential nominee should act with a majority of the 
special committee.  The presidential nominee should then fill the vacancy on 
the ticket’s second spot with approval from a majority of the national 
committee. 
F.  Delaying the Election 
In some candidate death or inability scenarios, it might make sense to delay 
the election.76  An election should only be delayed when absolutely 
necessary.  None of the United States’s fifty-nine presidential elections has 
been postponed.77  That no level of turmoil—including a civil war78—has 
prevented on-time presidential elections is a sign of the strength of the 
nation’s democracy.  And conducting elections as scheduled has more than 
symbolic value.  A candidate could seek to delay an election as part of an 
attempt to undermine the democratic process.  Nonetheless, allowing voters 
to make informed choices is integral to democracy, and candidate death or 
inability immediately before an election might make it hard for voters to learn 
about replacement candidate(s).  If a vacancy happened especially close to 
an election, a delay might be necessary for the party to follow an adequate 
process for selecting replacement(s). 
An election delay would need to be coordinated at the national level 
because the date of presidential elections is set by federal law.79  Congress 
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also has the power to postpone the meeting of the Electoral College,80 which 
might be necessary if Election Day were pushed back.  Inauguration Day 
cannot be changed by legislation; the Constitution requires that it occur on 
January 20 in the year after an election.81  Any election delay due to a 
candidate death or inability should be brief.  For the orderly transfer of power 
to occur in January, the winning candidate’s transition work should ideally 
begin in November.82 
Congress might pass a law providing a mechanism for an automatic delay 
of an election if a candidate death or inability happened close to an election.  
Professor Akhil Reed Amar has suggested such an approach.  He proposed 
the chief justice of the United States as a possible official to certify that a 
death or inability had occurred in order to trigger a delay.83  Another 
possibility is the appointment of a commission to handle potential delays.  
Professor Jerry Goldfeder has previously proposed using a commission to 
decide on postponing an election in the event of a terrorist attack.84  He 
outlined two possible commissions for Congress to consider creating:  one 
with representatives of the parties and any independent candidates and 
another with congressional leaders.85  A hybrid approach with both 
congressional leaders and party representatives is also worth consideration.  
The party representatives could provide input on whether a delay is necessary 
for their party to select new candidates, while the elected officials could make 
the commission’s decision more accountable to the public. 
G.  Candidate Health Disclosures 
Transparency about primary candidates’ health might reduce the chances 
that prospective candidates who are at high risk of serious medical issues will 
decide to run—possibly making it less likely that the parties would ever need 
to use the vacancy procedures.  Furthermore, voters deserve to know at least 
some information about candidates’ health.  Unfortunately, candidates have 
not always been forthcoming.86  Incentivizing transparency, as opposed to 
requiring it, might be most realistic.  Approaches that merit consideration are 
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a commission that establishes standards for health disclosures, which 
Fordham Law School’s Second Clinic on Presidential Succession 
recommended,87 or a commission that conducts voluntary exams of 
candidates, which Fordham Law School’s Democracy and the Constitution 
Clinic recommended.88 
II.  DEATH OR INABILITY AFTER ELECTION DAY BUT BEFORE THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE VOTE 
There are no established procedures for candidate death or inability after 
Election Day but before the Electoral College meeting.  On Election Day, 
voters technically cast ballots for electors, not presidential or vice 
presidential candidates.89  The political parties choose their electors in each 
state before the election.90  If candidates died or became disabled after the 
election, their parties might attempt to instruct the electors to vote for certain 
replacements when the electors cast their votes about a month-and-a-half 
after Election Day.  That is what happened when Horace Greeley died shortly 
after the 1872 election.91  Whether electors would or could follow such 
instructions is unclear. 
A.  Electors’ Varying Authority in Death and Inability Scenarios 
Thirty-three states and Washington, D.C., have “faithless elector” laws 
that prohibit electors from exercising discretion in casting their votes.92  The 
rest of the states allow electors to vote how they choose, though it is very rare 
for unbound electors to vote for anyone other than the presidential and vice 
presidential candidates who won the popular votes in their states.93  But that 
norm might be disrupted by candidate death or disability; the electors might 
follow instructions from their political party or vote for a candidate of their 
own choosing. 
Different wording in states’ faithless elector laws appears to create varying 
requirements for electors when candidates die or become disabled.  In 
thirteen states and Washington, D.C., electors are required to vote for their 
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party’s candidate or nominee.94  These laws would probably require electors 
to vote for a replacement candidate chosen by the electors’ party, even if their 
party selected the replacement after the election.  The replacements would 
become the parties’ candidates or nominees for whom the electors are 
required to vote by law.  Virginia’s law requires electors to vote for “the 
nominees of the national convention to which the state convention elects 
delegates.”95  Unless a political party reconvened its convention to fill a 
vacancy, which the Republican National Committee’s rules do provide as an 
option, electors in Virginia might not be required to vote for replacement 
candidates. 
Fifteen states have faithless elector laws that would require electors to vote 
for a dead or disabled candidate.  Not all of those laws, however, impose a 
penalty for faithless votes, though some call for the automatic cancellation of 
faithless votes.  The laws in nine of those states require electors to vote for 
the winner of the popular vote in the state.  In four states, the laws demand 
that electors vote for the candidate for whom they agreed to serve.  And, in 
two states, the electors must vote for the candidates who appear on their 
parties’ ballots on Election Day.  None of these laws make exceptions for 
candidate death or inability.96 
Some laws have explicit or implicit exceptions.  Hawaii and Tennessee 
require electors to vote for their parties’ nominees “if both candidates are 
alive.”97  Electors in Utah must vote for their parties’ nominees, “except in 
the cases of death or felony conviction of a candidate.”98  The Wisconsin 
statute states, “A presidential elector is not required to vote for a candidate 
who is deceased at the time of the meeting [of the Electoral College].”99 
B.  Challenges to Reform 
Requiring electors to vote for the popular vote winners, including when 
candidates die or become disabled, is the approach that is most consistent 
with the principles underlying the modern presidential election system.100  
Although the Constitution’s framers envisioned the electors deliberating to 
select the president, they have virtually never done so.101  “Almost 
immediately, presidential electors became trusty transmitters of other 
people’s decisions,” the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Chiafalo v. 
Washington.102  In Chiafalo, which was decided in July 2020, the Court 
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upheld the constitutionality of state faithless elector statutes that bar electors 
from exercising their own discretion.103  The Court based its ruling in part on 
the “established practice” of the Electoral College serving as “a mechanism 
not for deliberation but for party-line voting.”104 
Because electors do not have a consequential part in selecting the president 
and vice president, most voters pay no attention to who they are.  They are 
chosen by the leaders of their state political parties and may not represent the 
views of voters who cast ballots for their parties’ candidates.  Allowing 
electors to intervene to select replacements for dead or disabled candidates 
would be undemocratic and inconsistent with how the Electoral College 
works in practice. 
It is also undesirable for political parties to be involved in choosing 
replacements.  The parties could use the same processes described in their 
party rules to choose new candidates for the electors to support.  In 1912, 
Republican electors followed instructions from their party to vote for a 
replacement for James Sherman, the vice presidential nominee who died 
shortly before his ticket lost the election.105  But replacements named by a 
party would not necessarily be representative of the will of the voters.  If the 
political parties chose replacement candidates before the election, voters 
would still be able to register their preferences, which adds a measure of 
accountability and legitimacy.  Voters would obviously no longer have that 
opportunity after Election Day.  Prioritizing voters’ input is consistent with 
the diminished role of party establishments in selecting presidential 
nominees.106 
State laws that require electors to vote for dead or disabled candidates 
would recognize that the Electoral College process is a formality.107  This 
approach would allow for candidate death and inability scenarios to be 
resolved in the same way from Election Day to the inauguration.  After 
electors voted for a deceased or disabled candidate, the candidate would 
become president-elect or vice president-elect for the purposes of the 
Twentieth Amendment, and the amendment’s succession procedures would 
apply.108 
However, this policy would raise legal and policy concerns.  First, it is 
unclear whether states have authority to require electors to vote for dead 
candidates.  In Chiafalo, the Supreme Court left the issue unresolved, stating 
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that its decision should not be interpreted to allow faithless elector statutes 
that mandate electoral votes for deceased candidates.109 
Second, Congress’s decision to not count Greeley’s electoral votes after 
the 1872 election set a precedent that a future Congress might cite to avoid 
counting the votes for a dead candidate.110  But the Greeley precedent might 
not be difficult to overcome.  Professor Amar suggests that Congress should 
undo the precedent by passing a law requiring the counting of electoral votes 
for dead candidates.111  Even without a law, the Greeley precedent might not 
be entitled to much weight.  Professor Joel Goldstein calls it “extremely 
weak” because Congress hardly debated its decision and Greeley had lost the 
election decisively, making the counting of his electoral votes 
inconsequential under the circumstances.112 
Third, the Constitution’s text might be interpreted to prevent electors from 
voting for candidates who have died.  Professor Goldstein highlights this 
concern, observing that the Twelfth Amendment authorizes electors to vote 
for a “person,” which might not include a decedent.113  This issue could give 
Congress another reason not to count electoral votes for dead candidates and 
it could provide a basis for opposing candidates to file lawsuits. 
Fourth, if both the winning presidential and vice presidential candidates 
died, casting electoral votes for them would lead to the speaker of the House, 
the next official in the line of succession, becoming acting president on 
Inauguration Day.114  This outcome would be highly undemocratic if the 
speaker of the House did not belong to the same party as the deceased 
candidates.  The party that lost the presidential election would have the 
opportunity to hold the White House for a full four-year term. 
Given these concerns, other alternatives deserve consideration.  One 
possibility is for states’ faithless elector statutes to require electors to vote for 
the vice presidential candidate for president if the presidential candidate dies.  
The electors might also be required to vote for a new vice presidential 
candidate named by the new presidential candidate.  But giving a presidential 
candidate unchecked authority to name a vice presidential candidate is 
inconsistent with the vice presidential replacement process in the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which requires assent from majorities of both 
houses of Congress.115  The dual death scenarios are even more vexing 
because the only alternatives might be to allow the parties or electors to name 
replacements, which would be problematic for the reasons discussed.116 
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The challenges related to candidate death and inability between Election 
Day and the casting of electoral votes stem from the Electoral College 
system’s flaws.117  The only complete solution may come from abolishing 
the Electoral College, which would require a constitutional amendment. 
III.  DEATH OR INABILITY AFTER THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE VOTE 
The Twentieth Amendment provides for succession contingencies 
involving the president-elect and vice president-elect.  Lawmakers who 
designed the amendment believed candidates became president-elect and 
vice president-elect after the Electoral College vote in mid-December, as 
opposed to after Congress’s counting of the electoral votes on January 6.118  
This interpretation is not universally accepted,119 but it makes practical sense 
for the purposes of the Twentieth Amendment.  The Twelfth Amendment 
requires Congress to count electoral votes for candidates who die after the 
electors cast their votes.120  Therefore, the Twentieth Amendment’s 
provisions will inevitably apply to candidates who die after the Electoral 
College meeting, no matter the definition of president-elect and vice 
president-elect.  The procedures for death of presidential and vice 
presidential candidates are clear in most cases, but there is ambiguity when 
it comes to the amendment’s treatment of inability. 
A.  Death of President-Elect and/or Vice President-Elect 
If the president-elect dies, the Twentieth Amendment provides that the 
vice president-elect becomes president on Inauguration Day.121  The 
Twentieth Amendment extends the Constitution’s designation of the vice 
president as the first successor to the presidency into the pre-inaugural 
period.122  There is no process for selecting a new vice president-elect; as 
soon as the president takes office, he or she could use the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to appoint a vice president with approval from Congress.123 
The Twentieth Amendment does not explicitly provide for the death of 
both the president-elect and vice president-elect.  But that contingency is 
almost certainly covered by Section 3, which states, in part, “Congress may 
by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice 
President elect shall have qualified.”124  A failure to “qualify” was intended 
to cover any contingency that made the president-elect and vice 
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president-elect unavailable to take the oath of office on Inauguration Day;125 
such contingencies certainly include death.126  Congress has passed a law 
pursuant to this power.  The Presidential Succession Act of 1947127 
designates successors for when the president-elect and vice president-elect 
fail to qualify.128  In that scenario, the speaker of the House would be sworn 
in to act as president.129  If there were no speaker, the Senate president pro 
tempore would become acting president.130  The rest of the line of succession 
comprises the heads of the executive departments.131  Cabinet secretaries 
who were still in office in this scenario would have been appointed during 
the prior presidential term. 
Congress should change the line of succession for pre-inaugural 
contingencies to guarantee that the legislative leaders of the president-elect’s 
party are the successors.  The current line of succession could lead to the 
undemocratic result of the party that lost the presidential election taking the 
White House on Inauguration Day because the speaker and president pro 
tempore are not always members of the president-elect’s party. 
A revised line of succession should provide that the speaker of the House 
is the first in the statutory line of succession when the president-elect and 
speaker of the House belong to the same party.  When they are from different 
parties, the House minority leader should be first in the line.132  The president 
pro tempore should not be in the line of succession.  It is customarily a 
position held by the most senior member of the majority party in the Senate, 
meaning the president pro tempore, while distinguished, is almost always in 
the twilight of their career and not necessarily prepared to assume the 
responsibilities of the presidency.133  When the Senate is held by the 
president-elect’s party, the Senate majority leader should be second in the 
statutory line of succession.  Otherwise, the Senate minority leader should be 
second.134 
Some proposals for reforming the presidential line of succession would 
remove legislators.  Under these proposals, members of the Cabinet would 
comprise all or most of the line of succession.135  There are compelling 
arguments for removing legislators from the line of succession,136 especially 
because they may not be constitutionally eligible successors to the presidency 
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when vacancies occur after the inauguration.137  But these proposals are 
focused on vacancies in the presidency and vice presidency.  In a scenario 
where the president-elect and vice president-elect die, they could not appoint 
members of the Cabinet, making a Cabinet line of succession impractical.  
Additionally, concerns about the constitutionality of legislative succession 
would not exist in the pre-inaugural period because the Twentieth 
Amendment appears to allow a broader range of people to act as president in 
the event of vacancies during this time.  Article II limits post-inauguration 
successors to “Officer[s],”138 who some argue are only Senate-confirmed 
executive branch officials.139  The Twentieth Amendment uses a more 
general term for potential pre-inauguration successors:  “person[s].”140 
B.  Inability of the President-Elect and/or Vice President-Elect 
Inability of the president-elect or vice president-elect is covered by the 
Twentieth Amendment.  Although the amendment’s text does not mention 
inability, the legislative history strongly suggests that the “failure to qualify” 
language encompasses inability.141  Accordingly, in cases where the 
president-elect is unable, the vice president-elect becomes acting president 
on Inauguration Day and serves in that capacity until the inability ends and 
the president assumes office.142  However, there is no clear procedure for 
declaring the existence of an inability. 
The vice president-elect might have the authority to make an inability 
declaration.  Before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provided procedures for 
declaring presidential inabilities, some scholars suggested that the 
“contingent grant of power theory” gave the vice president authority to 
determine that the president was disabled.143  That theory holds that the 
person who is empowered to act in a certain circumstance, such as by 
discharging the presidency’s powers and duties, has the power to determine 
whether that circumstance exists.144  Yet, the contingent grant of power 
theory does not provide the unquestionable legal basis that should exist for 
transfer of presidential authority. 
Congress should pass a law for declaring the president-elect unable.  A 
procedure would help ensure that there was someone to ably discharge the 
powers of the presidency immediately at the start of a new term.  
Additionally, an incapacitated president would not be able to appoint a 
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Cabinet, which would complicate the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s use if the 
president was not an incumbent.145  One possibility is to authorize the vice 
president-elect and congressional leaders of the president-elect’s party146 to 
make the declaration.  This procedure should be reserved for the most 
unambiguous cases of inability, such as those involving unconsciousness, so 
approval from the vice president-elect and all of the congressional leaders 
might be required.  And the president-elect might be given unilateral 
authority to declare an inability over. 
The Twentieth Amendment does not provide explicit authorization for 
Congress to create a procedure for declaring inabilities.  But because a 
procedure is essential to make the amendment function, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause should provide a sufficient basis for creating a procedure.147 
Congress should also create a process for declaring a dual inability of both 
the president-elect and vice president-elect.  Congressional leaders of the 
president-elect’s party and the person who is next in the line of succession—
typically the speaker of the House—might be empowered to approve an 
inability determination. 
C.  Contingent Election Gaps 
There are no procedures for candidate death or inability in a situation 
where Congress must choose the winner of the presidential or vice 
presidential race in a “contingent election.”  Contingent elections occur when 
no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes.148  If no candidate 
receives a majority in the presidential contest, the Twelfth Amendment lets 
the House of Representatives choose the winner from the three candidates 
who received the most electoral votes.  In a House-contingent election, each 
state delegation receives one vote, and the candidate who receives a majority 
of all of the states wins.  The Senate is responsible for choosing a vice 
president if none of the candidates win a majority of electoral votes.  Senators 
select from the top two candidates, and each senator has one vote, with a 
majority required to prevail.149 
The Twentieth Amendment’s Section 4 authorizes Congress to pass a law 
providing procedures for “death of any of the persons” from whom the House 
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or Senate may choose in contingent elections.150  But Congress has not done 
so since the Twentieth Amendment was ratified in 1933.151 
The most sensible, yet flawed, law for the death of a presidential candidate 
in a contingent election would provide for a deceased presidential candidate’s 
running mate to become the replacement presidential candidate.  This 
approach, which Professor Brian Kalt recommends,152 would automatically 
provide a replacement presidential candidate and avoid the undemocratic 
option of letting a political party or electors choose a replacement after voters 
have cast their ballots.  It would also recognize the vice president’s role as 
the first successor to the presidency. 
Complications arise because the running mate would probably be a 
candidate for the vice presidency in the Senate-contingent election.153  If the 
running mate stepped down from the vice presidential candidacy to become 
the presidential candidate, the running mate’s party would not be represented 
in the Senate-contingent election.  Not only would the party not have a 
chance to win the vice presidency, it would be out of contention for the 
presidency if the House-contingent election resulted in a deadlock. 
Whether legal authority exists to name a replacement to run in the Senate 
in this scenario is unclear.  Section 4’s first clause gives Congress the 
authority to “provide for” the death of a presidential candidate, and its second 
clause gives authority to “provide for” the death of a vice presidential 
candidate.154  Because death is the only contingency listed, a narrow reading 
might indicate that Congress can only authorize naming a replacement when 
the vice presidential candidate dies.  However, a broader interpretation could 
support naming a new vice presidential candidate as part of the authority to 
“provide for” the death of the presidential candidate. 
An alternative to naming a replacement vice presidential candidate is for 
the running mate to be a candidate in both the House- and Senate-contingent 
elections.155  If the running mate won in both the House and the Senate, the 
running mate could vacate the vice president-elect position.  Then, after 
taking office as president, that individual could nominate a vice president 
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through the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s process.  Even though the 
Constitution clearly does not envision the president and vice president being 
the same person,156 there is no explicit constitutional prohibition against this 
arrangement.  But it could still invite lawsuits that would call into question 
the legitimacy of the election’s outcome. 
Congress should “provide for” the sole death of a vice presidential 
candidate before a contingent election by allowing the presidential candidate 
to name a replacement.  This policy would embrace the discretion presidents 
have to choose their vice presidents.  The Senate would provide a meaningful 
check, similar to how Congress must approve a replacement vice president 
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment157 and how the political parties must 
support the presidential candidate’s vice presidential pick.158 
For a scenario in which both the presidential candidate and the vice 
presidential candidate died, the only realistic option might be for Congress 
to pass a law allowing the deceased candidates’ party (or electors for 
independent candidates) to name new presidential and vice presidential 
candidates.  Allowing the political parties to replace candidates after an 
election is far from ideal.  A party could choose a replacement who was more 
politically extreme than the original candidate.  And the possibility of a 
candidate taking office as president without winning any popular votes raises 
serious democratic legitimacy concerns.  Accordingly, Congress might 
consider requiring approval for a party’s replacement from that party’s 
congressional leaders. 
If a presidential candidate or vice presidential candidate became physically 
or mentally unable, the candidate should still participate in a contingent 
election.  If an unable candidate won a contingent election, a process like the 
one suggested earlier for declaring inabilities in presidents-elect and vice 
presidents-elect could be employed.159 
D.  Inauguration Day Vulnerability 
A catastrophic incident on Inauguration Day could unleash a precarious 
succession scenario.  On Inauguration Day, the outgoing and incoming 
president and vice president traditionally convene at the Capitol for the 
swearing-in ceremony.160  The two legislative leaders who are the next in the 
presidential line of succession—the speaker of the House and the Senate 
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president pro tempore—are typically there, too.161  If all of those officials 
were killed or incapacitated in an attack, the line of succession would reach 
the leaders of the Cabinet departments.  But, when a new president is taking 
office, almost all of the outgoing Cabinet secretaries normally resign by noon 
on Inauguration Day,162 which is the time set by the Twentieth Amendment 
for the end of the presidential term.163 
Before the Senate confirms the new president’s Cabinet secretaries, the 
departments are led by acting secretaries, whose eligibility as presidential 
successors is questionable.  The line of succession statute and its legislative 
history leave the matter unaddressed.164  Since the statute does not explicitly 
bar them from acting as president, an acting secretary probably would serve 
in that capacity after an Inauguration Day catastrophe—if only because there 
would be no other officials who were even arguably eligible.  Of course, that 
outcome is far from ideal—and not only because of the eligibility ambiguity.  
Acting secretaries are lower-ranking officials who might be ill-suited to serve 
as president.  Additionally, an acting secretary might be from a different 
political party than the president-elect. 
An acting secretary would serve as president until the House chose a new 
speaker or the Senate chose new a president pro tempore.165  That process 
could take time, especially given that many members of both chambers 
probably would have been at the inauguration and, as a result, in harm’s way. 
Prior administrations have recognized the Inauguration Day succession 
vulnerability.  In fact, officials confronted the possibility of an attack on the 
2009 swearing-in ceremony, when intelligence revealed a potentially 
credible terrorist bomb plot.  Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who was slated 
to remain in his post in the new administration, did not attend the ceremony 
as a precaution.166  In 2017, President Barack Obama’s Homeland Security 
secretary remained in office and stayed away from incoming President 
Trump’s swearing-in.  President pro tempore Orrin Hatch also avoided the 
gathering.167  It is not publicly known whether similar precautions were taken 
for the 2021 Inauguration,168 which occurred only two weeks after a mob 
stormed the Capitol, with some in the crowd rampaging over the platform 
constructed for the inauguration.169 
 
 161. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 956. 
 162. Id. 
 163. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. 
 164. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 954–56. 
 165. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2). 
 166. Peter Baker, Obama’s War over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 4, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.html [https://perma.cc/CM85-
B9ZD]. 
 167. Second Succession Clinic, supra note 16, at 957. 
 168. Patricia Kime, Who Was the Designated Survivor for the Inauguration?:  Outgoing 
Administration Doesn’t Say, MILITARY (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.military.com/daily-
news/2021/01/20/who-was-designated-survivor-inauguration-outgoing-administration-
doesnt-say.html [https://perma.cc/68Q9-JCRV]. 
 169. Will Weissert, Capitol Siege Raises Security Worries for Biden Inauguration, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 8, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-
608 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
The practice of a member of the outgoing president’s Cabinet serving as a 
designated survivor is sensible, but it leaves open the possibility of an official 
from the party that lost the election taking over as acting president.  A better 
policy has been recommended by Fordham Law School’s Second 
Presidential Succession Clinic and the Continuity of Government 
Commission.  Their proposal would involve the Senate confirming some of 
the incoming president’s top-ranking Cabinet secretaries shortly before the 
inauguration.170  Then, some or all of the newly confirmed department heads 
could wait out the ceremony off-site. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2020 election cycle and many before it illustrate an unfortunate 
reality:  threats to the health and safety of presidential and vice presidential 
candidates are real.  Congress and the political parties should give careful 
consideration to improving and supplementing the procedures for 
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